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The Norwegian authorities adhere to a long and firm practice of 
stipulating various conditions in petroleum production licenses that the 
licensees must fulfill following the award. The two primary license terms 
contemplate completion of the “work obligation” and entrance into an 
“Agreement Concerning Petroleum Activities,” which includes “Attachment 
A–Joint Operating Agreement” and “Attachment B–Accounting 
Agreement.”1 Furthermore, production licenses will normally contain so-
called “miscellaneous conditions,” outlining, inter alia, licensees’ obligation 
to take environmental matters into account when performing petroleum 
activities. 
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the Norwegian 
authorities’ practice to conditionally award production licenses, focusing 
on the two main license terms, as these are the most practical and legally 
interesting conditions. Part I provides an overview of the legal structure 
governing petroleum production in Norway, where the state’s prominent 
role is a striking feature. 
Part II explores the obligation to enter into an “Agreement Concerning 
Petroleum Activities,” including a joint operating agreement (JOA). This 
section provides a short discussion on the JOA’s rare legal significance in 
Norwegian law. It has been asserted in legal theory that the JOA, which is 
a standardized agreement for all production licenses operating on the 
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Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), should be considered as regulations 
and not a license term as such for the individual joint venture. 
Furthermore, the JOA is undoubtedly an ordinary contract between the 
licensees, subject to general rules of contract law. Thus, the fulfilment of 
the obligations stipulated in the JOA is both a prerequisite for the 
fulfilment of the license terms2 and of the contractual obligations as 
between the licensees. 
Part III examines the “work obligation” pursuant to the Norwegian 
Petroleum Act, as further specified in the production license and the JOA. 
A recent discussion in Norwegian legal theory has been whether 
contingent activities related to decision-making fall within the scope of the 
“work obligation.” This question is important, as a licensee cannot go sole 
risk, assign its participating interest without the Management Committee’s 
approval, or withdraw from the joint venture before the “work obligation” 
has been completed. The fall in crude oil prices has brought along an 
increased preoccupation within petroleum companies in freeing 
themselves from non-commercial projects, for instance by withdrawing 
from the joint venture. The content of the work obligation has thus become 
subject to increased scrutiny. 
Part IV discusses the connection between the production license 
document and the JOA in regard to the term “work obligation.” It must be 
assumed that the King intended in awarding the production license that the 
content of the work obligation should be identical in regard to the 
production license and the JOA. Thus, the licensee must complete all 
activities listed in the production license, including the contingent 
activities, before it is allowed to go sole risk, unilaterally assign its 
participating interest and withdraw from the joint venture. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NORWEGIAN REGIME OF PETROLEUM 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Section 1-1 of the Norwegian Petroleum Act (PA)3 declares that 
ownership of subsea resources on the NCS, and management thereof, lies 
with the Norwegian state. In line with this decree, Section 1-3 prescribes 
that no party other than the Norwegian state may conduct petroleum 
activities without the licenses, approvals, and consents required pursuant 
to the PA. Thus, a prominent feature of Norway’s petroleum system is its 
concession-based nature. 
                                                                                                             
 2. Or, if the JOA is viewed as regulations, as a prerequisite for the fulfilment 
of the regulations. 
 3. The Norwegian Petroleum Act of 29 November 1996, no. 72. 




Production licenses on the NCS are awarded through two different 
licensing rounds. The first is the ordinary license rounds. This usually 
takes place every other year. The twenty-third license round will be 
awarded during 2016. The second alternative consists of license awards in 
predefined areas (APA rounds), which take place annually. 
The two types of rounds are distinguishable in that the ordinary license 
rounds cover new areas on the NCS, where the geology is more unknown, 
while the APA rounds relate to mature areas that have been awarded in 
previous ordinary license rounds and later been relinquished.4 Ownership 
in production licenses can alternatively be obtained directly through direct 
purchase of license interests or indirectly by purchasing shares in 
petroleum companies holding license interests on the NCS.5 
Pursuant to Section 3-3, Paragraph 3 of the PA, a production license 
grants an exclusive right to exploration, exploration drilling, and 
production deposits in areas covered by the license. The King in Council 
(King) has the exclusive power to award production licenses. With a few 
historical exceptions, these licenses are always granted to groups of 
petroleum companies that together form a joint venture.6 The initial period 
of the awarded license generally runs for five to eight years but can be 
extended if the license terms are fulfilled. The group’s composition is 
decided by objective and non-discriminatory criteria, with the key 
objective being the assembly of petroleum companies that together further 
the best possible resource management. The two main criteria for 
determining whether a licensee is qualified at the NCS are the applicant’s 
financial capacity and technical competence. Authorities may also 
consider their previous experiences with the applicant. An increasingly 
more common feature since the start of the 21st century is that smaller 
petroleum companies have become increasingly more common licensees 
on the NCS.7 
The PA explicitly empowers the King8 to condition the license award 
upon entry into a JOA and completion of the work obligation, pursuant to 
                                                                                                             
 4. This difference plays an important role when it comes to the extent of the 
“work obligation” licensees must complete as a condition of the award. See also 
infra Part IV. 
 5. Such direct and indirect transfers cannot take place without the approval 
of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) and the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF). Since July 1, 2009, notification to the MOF is generally sufficient. 
 6. As discussed in Part II.B infra, the joint venture has many of the same 
characteristics as a company with liability. 
 7. The general view of the Norwegian authorities and the petroleum industry 
is that the introduction of smaller players on the NCS has spurred heightened 
activity and increased tax revenues. 
 8. Powers given to the King can be delegated to ministries and subordinate 
authorities, according to firm practice and legal theories of administrative and 




Section 3-3 and Section 3-8, respectively. The PA also contains a general 
legal basis for stipulating conditions in Section 10-18, Paragraph 4, which 
reads as follows: 
In connection with individual administrative decisions, other 
conditions than those mentioned in this Act may be stipulated, 
when they are naturally linked with the measures or the activities 
to which the individual administrative decisions relate.9 
This provision creates a legal basis for the King to set a wide range of 
conditions.10 In principle, such conditions can be stipulated in all phases 
of petroleum activities, from the award of an exploration license to 
decisions relating to the disposal of a production field, insofar as doing so 
meets the requirements in the provision. From the preparatory works to 
Section 10-18, it follows that the “the specific provisions providing 
authority to set conditions [such as Sections 3-3 and 3-8], shall not limit 
the power to stipulate conditions in accordance with this general 
provision.”11 Thus, Paragraph 4 of Section 3-3 and Section 3-8 must be 
interpreted in light of Section 10-18, Paragraph 4. If a condition could be 
stipulated under Section 10-18, Paragraph 4, it must follow from the 
internal connection in the PA that such conditions can be stipulated 
according to the applicable “special provision.” 
II. THE OBLIGATION TO ENTER INTO A JOA 
A. Introduction 
A joint venture is responsible for a wide range of matters pertaining to 
the production license under which it was established, from selecting 
                                                                                                             
constitutional law. Powers given to the “King of Council” cannot, however, be 
delegated to ministries and subordinate authorities. In practice, the MPE prepares 
the groundwork for the King of Council’s decision, and so in reality, effectively 
decides the composition of the production license. 
 9. The Norwegian Petroleum Act of 29 November 1996, no. 72, § 10–18. 
 10. Under the general rule of Norwegian administrative law, a public 
authority can stipulate conditions in connection with individual administrative 
decisions, such as concessions, without having explicit legal basis in the 
applicable law. cf Rt. 1961 p. 297 and TORSTEIN ECKHOFF & EIVIND SMITH, 
FORVALTNINGSRETT 414 (9th ed, 2010). A main justification for this right is that 
when a public authority has the power to reject an application or not grant a 
license, it must also be entitled to decide upon a less burdensome action—to 
accept an application or to grant a right under certain conditions. However, it is 
obviously more predictable to entities and persons involved in the relevant area, 
that the applicable law explicitly states that the authorities may stipulate 
conditions. 
 11. Ot.prp.nr.43 (1995-96) p. 65. 




contractors to deciding on the next year’s work program and budget. 
Furthermore, the individual licensee has an interest in having predictable 
rules governing default by the other licensees, assignment of its 
participating interest, etc. Combined, this situation creates a strong need 
to regulate the internal relationship in the production license. 
Pursuant to Section 3-3, Paragraph 4, of the PA, “The King may 
stipulate as a condition for granting a production license that the licensees 
shall enter into agreements with specified contents with one another.” By 
well-settled practice, the production license granted by the King contains 
a provision obligating the licensees to enter into an “Agreement 
Concerning Petroleum Activities,” commonly referred to as the “Special 
Conditions” for the individual joint venture, with “Attachment A—Joint 
Operating Agreement” and “Attachment B—Accounting Agreement.”12 
The MPE has approved this contract as a standard agreement applicable to 
all production licenses. 
The main consideration behind Paragraph 4 of Section 3-3 is the 
Norwegian state’s desire to exercise control over the activities of the joint 
venture. The country risks compromising its sensible management of 
Norwegian petroleum resources to the autonomous management of the 
joint venture, without that control. Thus a close connection ties the starting 
point of the PA—that the subsea resources belong to the Norwegian 
state—to the state’s desire to control not only which companies are granted 
a production license, but also how such licenses are executed. 
Furthermore, a mandatory standard contract avoids long-lasting and 
expensive negotiations between licensees on the contractual terms of the 
joint venture. In addition, standardized terms also ensure that employees 
of the petroleum companies will be familiar with the content of contract 
and thus will be able to use their acquired knowledge from other joint 
ventures. 
The various elements of the standard contract regulate different 
aspects of the joint venture. The Special Conditions regulate, inter alia, 
the parties to the joint venture and their participating interests, the operator 
of the joint venture, and the joint venture’s voting rules.13 As the name 
                                                                                                             
 12. See Agreement Concerning Petroleum Activities, MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM 
& ENERGY,https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/oed/vedlegg/konses 
jonsverk/kverkengelsk2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q9S-THBB] (last visited 
September 15, 2015) (unofficial source). A reservoir could cover several licenses 
where unitization between the licenses entails the most efficient exploration of the 
reservoir. If this scenario is the case, the licensees are obliged to enter into a 
Unitization Agreement (Unit Agreement) and to establish a common joint venture for 
both licenses. The Unit Agreement will consist of mainly the same elements as the 
normal JOA and Accounting Agreement. 
 13. See id. The principal voting rule is that “Unless otherwise stipulated in 
this Agreement [i.e. Special Conditions, JOA and the Accounting Agreement], a 




indicates, the Special Conditions are particular to each joint venture, in the 
sense that they vary on certain points from venture to venture. The Special 
Conditions nevertheless constitute a standardized agreement that always 
contains provisions on the parties to the venture, voting rules, and the like. 
The Accounting Agreement governs the practical matters relating to 
costs incurred by the joint venture. The content includes cash calls, 
statements and billings, charges to the joint account, and interest on 
outstanding payments. The provisions are technical in nature and essential 
to the operation of the joint venture’s activities. The obligation to 
contribute funds to the joint venture, however, is not stipulated in the 
Accounting Agreement but in the JOA. 
B. The Joint Operating Agreement: The Fundamental Legal Basis of the 
Joint Venture’s Activities. 
The JOA governs all matters pertaining to the joint venture and is the 
fundamental legal basis for the licensees’ obligations toward one another. 
The JOA is identical for all production licenses awarded on the NCS.14 
An operator is responsible for the daily operations of each joint 
venture. The operator conducts its role on a “no gain, no loss” basis, 
meaning that the operator neither receives compensation nor assumes 
liability for the activities of the joint venture. However, the JOA contains 
a narrow exception prescribing operator liability if the joint venture or any 
of its participants sustains losses due to the willful or gross negligence of 
the operator’s management or supervisory personnel or any of its affiliated 
companies.15 
The supreme body of the joint venture is the management committee. 
One member in the management committee represents each participant of 
                                                                                                             
decision by the management committee is adopted when at least [y] of the 
Members representing at least [x] % of the Participating interests have voted in 
favour of a proposal.” The content of [y] and [x] are stipulated based on the 
number of participants in the joint venture and their respective participating 
interest. The most common rule is that a decision is adopted when the majority of 
the members representing more than 50% of the participating interest have voted 
in favour of a proposal. Certain decisions, such a field development, surrender of 
a license or part of a license area and discharge of the operator, require unanimity. 
The Special Conditions also forbid the management committee from making a 
decision “which could render an unreasonable advantage to certain Parties or 
other to the detriment of other Parties or the joint venture.” 
 14. Any changes in the JOA will also apply to joint ventures established prior 
to the change. 
 15. It is understood that there has yet to be any judicial decision concluding 
that an operator has acted with willful misconduct and or gross negligence. This 
question is nevertheless practical in the sense that operator responsibility is often 
discussed in legal disputes as a potential legal basis. 




the joint venture; while the operator is the chairman, he does not enjoy an 
extra vote. The management committee performs the key role in executing 
the strategic processes of the venture and can vote on all subjects relevant 
to the joint venture. The committee also controls the activities of the 
operator. Additionally, the joint venture may appoint sub-committees 
dedicated to special matters, such as a technical committee. 
The joint venture participants are primarily liable to each other on a 
pro rata basis, meaning that each is secondarily, jointly, and severally 
liable for all obligations arising out of the venture’s activities. The 
participants are also obligated to contribute sufficient funds to cover all 
expenses relating to the joint venture’s activities in accordance with their 
respective participating interest. 
Participants have the right and obligation to take in kind and dispose 
of a share of the produced petroleum, also in accordance with each 
participant’s interest. The petroleum is then sold on a company basis. As 
there are joint expenses but no joint income, the joint venture is normally 
characterized as a “joint expenses enterprise.” 
Before petroleum reaches the so-called “lifting point,”16 it is owned as 
a joint asset in which each participant holds an ideal share in proportion to 
its participant interest. Other assets that are acquired or developed by the 
operator or the participants on behalf of the joint venture are also owned 
as joint assets, such as petroleum facilities and new technologies. 
If a participant defaults on its obligation to provide sufficient funds to 
the joint venture or to cover its liabilities, non-defaulting participants are 
obligated to advance the deficient amounts. If the default has not ceased 
within five working days after the operator requests such payment, the 
defaulting party loses both its right to vote and its access to data and 
information for as long as the default remains in effect. 
A participant is entitled to assign its interest or any part thereof. The 
sales and purchase agreement shall contain provisions obliging the 
assignee to be bound by the JOA and the conditions of the production 
license. If the work obligation in the production license has not been 
completed, the participant is not allowed to assign its interest without the 
consent of the management committee. 
The joint venture, established as a result of the production license, 
possesses many of the same characteristics as a partnership with 
apportioned liability. It constitutes a partnership in which the participants 
                                                                                                             
 16. The lifting point for oil is usually the point (valve) where the oil enters 
into the shuttle tanker, cf. Eirik Tveit, Praktiske kommentarer til standard 
samarbeidsavtale [Practical comments on the standard cooperation agreement], 
438 SCANDINAVIAN INSTITUTE OF MARITIME LAW [marIus] 275−76 (2014) 
(Nor.). The lifting point for natural gas is the point where the gas enters into the 
pipeline system, for further transport to the processing facilities. 




have unlimited personal liability for the total obligations of the 
partnership—indivisible or divisible in parts which together constitute the 
total obligations of the partnership—and which acts as one entity in 
relation to third parties. However, Section 1-1, Paragraph 4 of the 
Partnerships Act17 explicitly provides that the Act does not apply to 
cooperation agreements pursuant to the PA, including the JOA. 
Nevertheless, because of the close connection between joint ventures and 
general partnerships, legal theory has asserted that the Partnership Act 
applies as background law for the governance of the joint venture if the 
JOA is silent or incomplete on matters pertaining thereto.18 
The production license only requires that licensees enter into the JOA; 
it does not state that licensees are thereafter obligated to adhere to the 
provisions in JOA. This wording might be considered to mean that 
compliance with the JOA’s provisions is not a license term. However, 
according to accepted legal theory, the understanding remains that 
compliance with JOA provisions is indeed a license term. This conclusion 
is based partially on the fact that both the production license and the 
Special Conditions provide that “[a]mendments to, exceptions from or 
supplements to this Agreement shall be submitted to the Ministry for 
approval.”19 The necessity of the MPE’s approval to amend the agreement 
illustrates that the JOA is not solely an agreement between the participants. 
If that were the case, participants would be able to alter the JOA on the 
basis of the principle of freedom of contract intrinsic to Norwegian law. 
Furthermore, a scenario under which the licensees were free in their 
choosing to adhere to JOA provisions would be contrary to the Norwegian 
state’s clear objective of having a standardized contract. 
The obligations pursuant to the JOA are general in their nature and 
apply to all joint ventures operating on the NCS. Therefore, the JOA could 
be presumed to have many of the same characteristics as regulations. A 
valid argument could be made that the legal structure of the JOA is more 
reminiscent of regulations than of license terms, as the latter are individual 
                                                                                                             
 17. The Partnerships Act, Act No. 83 of 21 June 1985 (June 27, 1986), 
http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-19850621-083-eng.pdf [http: 
//perma.cc/6V8R-UQYH]. 
 18. Knut Kaasen, Samarbeid i olje – en spesiell selskapsrett, in SELSKAP, 
KONTRAKT, KONKURS OG RETTSKILDER : FESTSKRIFT TIL MADS HENRY ANDENÆ 
70 ÅR / 152, 165-70 (1. utg. 2010). 
 19. Special Conditions, MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM & ENERGY, art. 8, 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/oed/vedlegg/konsesjonsverk/kverke
ngelsk2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Q9S-THBB] (last visited September 15, 2015) 
(unofficial source); see also Standardized Production License, MINISTRY OF 
PETROLEUM & ENERGY, art. 6, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokument/dep/oed 
/lover_regler/reglement/konsesjonsverk/id748087/ [https://perma.cc/6AN9-JSR5] 
(last visited September 15, 2015). 




in nature. However, the correct legal conclusion is most likely that the JOA 
provisions constitute individual terms for the particular production license, 
as they are stipulated by the authorities for each production license. 
Based on the above, the JOA holds special legal significance in 
Norwegian law. On the one hand, it constitutes an undoubtedly binding 
agreement between the participants of the venture, just like any other 
agreement between participants of a joint venture or similar entity. On the 
other hand, compliance with the JOA’s terms is also a condition for the 
award of the production license. 
This duality of the JOA raises many interesting questions. One is 
whether the interpretation of the JOA should be based on the rules for 
interpreting administrative decisions or the principles for interpreting 
commercial contracts. These principles are generally very similar (the 
objective meaning of the wording is the starting point), but they also 
present some differences. For instance, the subjective view of the physical 
or legal person subject to a condition will not be relevant for the 
interpretation unless it has been directly or indirectly communicated to the 
authorities.20 It may be argued that if it can be established that the 
contracting parties had a mutual subjective interpretation of the wording 
at the time the contract was entered into, this interpretation will prevail 
regardless of what the objective wording might imply. Thus, it is 
theoretically possible that the licensees have a joint understanding of the 
wording of a JOA provision at the granting of the production license that 
differs from the objective meaning of the wording that has not been 
communicated to the authorities. The question then becomes whether the 
subjective understanding or the objective meaning shall be decisive. The 
JOA’s contractual role as between the license partners is most prevalent 
on a day-to-day basis, and it might appear as being the legally most 
important. The core of a JOA’s legal status nevertheless lies in its role as 
a license term; its purpose is first and foremost to be a tool for the 
Norwegian state to control the activities of the joint venture. This demands 
that the principles for interpreting administrative decisions should apply 
to the interpretation of the JOA.21 
The duality of the JOA also becomes apparent if a licensee asserts that 
a provision in the JOA, or the JOA as a whole, is invalid. Towards its 
license partners, the licensee must base its legal arguments on applicable 
                                                                                                             
 20. Norwegian law also allows for taking fairness into account in the 
interpretation, but a clear wording will usually prevail in situations where fairness 
implies another conclusion than the objective meaning of the wording. 
 21. Another possibility is that the same provision has one meaning in the 
internal relationship of the joint venture and another meaning in the axis between 
the joint venture and the authorities. In our opinion, such an approach would lead 
to unnecessary uncertainty and complexity and should be avoided. 




rules of contract law. As towards the authorities, however, the licensee 
must apply general administrative principles. Thus, the JOA illustrates 
how petroleum law has strong ties to both public and private law, which 
work simultaneously. 
III. THE REQUIREMENT TO COMPLETE THE WORK OBLIGATION 
Section 3-8 of the PA prescribes that “[t]he King may impose on the 
license a specific work obligation for the area covered by the production 
license.” Stipulation of a “work obligation” contingency is a long-standing 
practice imposed by the King. 
The general wording in Section 3-8 does not set any limitations on the 
content of the work obligation. This omission does not mean that the 
authorities are free to stipulate any condition they desire. The purpose of 
the PA—ensuring the management of resources for the long-term benefit 
of Norwegian society as a whole—must be taken into account in 
interpreting the extent of the right to stipulate conditions. Furthermore, 
according to general principles of administrative law, the condition (work 
obligation) imposed must not be disproportionately burdensome when 
compared with what is seeking to be achieved through the stipulated 
conditions.22 
The main drive behind Section 3-8 is to empower the King to control 
the activities of the production license and to incentivize the licensee to 
undertake activities that further the sensible management of Norwegian 
petroleum resources. 
Section 13 of the Regulations (RA) to the PA provides further 
guidance on the content and scope of the work obligation. That provision 
states: 
The work obligation mentioned in the Act section 3-8 may consist of 
exploration and exploration drilling of a certain number of wells 
down to specified depths or geological formations. The contents, 
extent of and the time limit for complying with the work obligation, 
shall be stipulated in the individual production licence . . . .23 
The wording of the provision explicitly mentions “exploration and 
exploration drilling of a certain number of wells” as a possible work 
obligation. However, the use of the phrase “may consist of” suggests the 
illustrative nature of the enumerated activities and the possibility that other 
work obligations may be stipulated as well. A work obligation that furthers 
a rational production of the petroleum resources in the area covered by the 
                                                                                                             
 22. Rt. 2003 p. 764; ECKHOFF & SMITH, supra note 10, at 411–12. 
 23. Regulations to Act relating to petroleum activities 27. June 1997 § 13. 




production license must, as the clear starting point, be considered legal in 
relation to Section 3-8 of the PA and Section 13 of the RA. 
The content of the work obligation will vary between ordinary license 
rounds and the APA rounds. In the ordinary license rounds, licensees are 
normally only obliged to collect and process seismic data and to decide 
whether to drill an exploration well.24 The APA rounds have a much more 
comprehensive work obligation, in which licensees are normally obligated not 
only to collect and process seismic data, but also to make a decision on drill 
or drop, concretization, continuation of the deposit, and whether to submit a 
plan for development and operation of the field to the MPE.25 The content of 
the work obligation also varies to some degree within the ordinary license and 
APA rounds, respectively. For example, some production licenses obligate 
licensees to complete drilling of an exploration well, rather than simply to 
make the decision as whether to drill such wells. 
Each individual production license will stipulate a specific deadline for 
completion of each of the various elements of the work obligation. The 
deadlines for each element are stipulated in accordance with the natural 
development of a field. For instance, the collecting and processing of seismic 
data must take place first. Then, an exploration well must be drilled before the 
licensees are able to decide whether the exploration drilling unveiled a 
commercially profitable reservoir. 
Each deadline starts to run from the award date of the production license. 
Normally, the collection and processing of 3D seismic data must be 
completed within one to two years from the award date; the decision on 
whether to drill an exploration well within two to three; the decision on 
concretization within four to six; the decision on continuation within five to 
seven; and finally the decision to submit a plan for development and operation 
to the MPE within six to nine years of the award date. If the licensees fail to 
carry out the work obligation within the deadlines, they lose their right to the 
license. The deadline must be completed for each element; it is not sufficient 
that licensees have a past record of completing elements within the deadline. 
When the licensees have completed the entirety of the work obligation, 
they may demand that the initial period of the production license be extended. 
The general rule is that the production license is extended for thirty years, but 
in certain circumstances the extension may stretch up to fifty. The MPE also 
has the power, pursuant to PA Section 3-15, to require that the work 
obligations are fulfilled prior to any surrender of the production license. 
                                                                                                             
 24. Often referred to as “drill or drop” condition. In practice, the seismic data 
referred to is usually 3D seismic. 
 25. The production license uses “work obligation” in the singular, despite the 
fact that the “work obligation” consists of several elements, which are natural to 
view as separate obligations. 




IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WORK OBLIGATION IN THE 
PRODUCTION LICENSE AND THE JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT 
A close relationship exists between the work obligation stipulated in 
the production license and the JOA. This connection grows from certain 
provisions in the JOA linked to completion of the work obligation outlined 
in the production license. Article 18.3(d) of the JOA prescribes that sole 
risk operations may not take place before the “obligatory work obligation 
in the Production License” has been completed. Furthermore, Article 23.1, 
Paragraph 2 states that before the “obligatory work commitment pursuant 
to the Production License” has been carried out, a party cannot assign its 
participating interest without the consent of the management committee. 
Finally, Article 24.1, Paragraph 1 determines that a party may withdraw 
from the joint venture “when the work obligation described in the 
Production License has been carried out.”26 
The licensee’s right to go sole risk, to assign its participating interest 
without the consent of the management committee, and to withdraw from 
the joint venture are all dependent on whether the work obligation in the 
production license has been carried out. 
In connection with the recent decline in oil prices, some petroleum 
companies on the NCS have explored the possibility of withdrawal from a 
joint venture. Since this requires completion of the work obligation, the 
content of the licensees’ work obligation contained in the production 
license has been scrutinized. It has been asserted in legal theory that it is 
“unnatural” to view decisions relating to concretization, continuation of a 
deposit, and submission of development and operation plans as part of the 
work obligation.27 The main argument is that these activities will only be 
carried out if licensees choose to do so; they are so-called contingent 
activities.28 
The traditional understanding of the work obligation is that it involves 
collecting and processing seismic data and drilling of exploration wells. 
Nevertheless, the argument can be made that the traditional understanding 
in the industry does not necessarily demand that so-called contingent 
activities fall outside the scope of the work obligation. The starting point 
                                                                                                             
 26. The English translation of the JOA by the MPE refers to the “obligatory” 
work obligation in the following articles: 18.3(d) on sole risk, 23.1 second 
paragraph on assignment, and 24.1 first paragraph on withdrawal. In the official 
Norwegian wording, however, the term “obligatory” work obligation is only 
included in the provisions on sole risk and assignment. There is no reason to 
believe that the word “obligatory” was intentionally included in articles 18.3(d) 
and 23.1 of the JOA, but not in article 24.1, and there is therefore no material 
difference between “work obligation” and “obligatory work obligation.” 
 27. Tveit, supra note 16, at 21–28. 
 28. Id. at 24–28. 




of Norwegian law rests upon the entitlement of authorities to change their 
practice if they deem it necessary to meet a new objective, or to adapt to 
changing surroundings—for instance a considerably matured NCS. The 
wording and structure of production licenses in the APA rounds clearly 
show that the work obligation also encompasses contingent activities. This 
conclusion is exemplified, inter alia, by the fact that the deadline for the 
last element of the work obligation coincides precisely with the expiration 
date of the production license’s initial period. 
The APA rounds are a recent phenomenon in Norway, aimed at 
securing production in the mature areas of the NCS. For such areas, 
fostering the fairly rapid development of possible deposits through 
licensee activities is crucial. One way to achieve this goal is to stipulate 
that licensees must carry out important decisions before a predetermined 
deadline. 
Thus, the term work obligation in the production license should be 
construed to encompass contingent activities related to decisions 
concerning continuation, development, and operation. 
The objective meaning of the production license strongly indicates 
that the work obligation may be comprised of contingent activities. The 
question is whether the same is true for the “work obligation” in the JOA. 
As the production license and the JOA are two separate legal grounds, it 
is, in principle, possible that the content of the “work obligation” differs 
between the two. It would be rather incongruous to interpret the terms 
differently, when the JOA expressly refers to the work obligation in the 
production license. It must be assumed that the King, in awarding the 
production license, intended that the content of the work obligation should 
be identical in regard to the production license and the JOA. The 
licensee—before it is allowed to go sole risk, unilaterally assign its 
participating interest and withdraw from the joint venture—must thus 
complete the so-called contingent activities.29 
                                                                                                             
 29. Cf. articles 18.3(d) 23.1 second paragraph and 24.1 first paragraph of the 
JOA. 

